RECENT TOPICS » View all
@vileru
I would like to try and influence your conception of consciousness:
http://www.mediafire.com/?5fwnc2jq1n0
http://www.mediafire.com/?2vymwzwozzy
http://www.physics.wisc.edu/undergrads/ … cc2003.pdf
I find it baffling that anyone would try to ignore neuroscience in such discourse, especially when it comes to that 'problem' of 'other minds'.
I guess we still need to figure out how God manages to keep our souls connected to our bodies, too. ;p
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 4:47 pm)
lolz, it's the pineal gland dude, descartes says so, and so does this guy : Rick Strassman, "M.D." : DMT: The Spirit Molecule
Last edited by kendo99 (2010 April 19, 5:05 pm)
@kendo - Have you read Meillassoux's After Finitude yet? It's a surprisingly quick read. I think the notion of 'hyperchaos' has interesting connections to a thread or two mentioned here.
I'm not sure a fruitful discussion can occur when there's no shared definitions. But J7's photos was worth it.
vileru wrote:
Philosophers who argue self-consciousness is consciousness [snipped illustrative eg] she is not self-aware, and is therefore unconscious
Seems like just repeating a conclusion - rather then an explanation of anything. Doesn't it still depend on defns of self-awareness and consciousness? big circle.
Regardless, the real strength of the argument comes from the fact that animals aren't considered ethical agents, that is, entities we hold responsible for their actions.
Not persuaded it's a real strong argument (but you don't need to defend it here):
Consciousness requires moral culpability. (according to your defn)
We don't treat animals like they have it. (although we can't know what's going on)
Therefore animals aren't conscious.
Consciousness includes suffering. (b/c ...)
Animals aren't conscious. (per above)
Therefore animals don't suffer.
However, I kindly suggest moving the conversation away from neuro-anatomy since its very easy to spiral out into wild speculation.
..unlike purely philosophical attempts to explain consciousness? ![]()
The hypotheticals in this thread have some interesting real life examples. That fellow who responded to an online ad to be cooked and eaten for dinner. And was. (Careful, blahah.) Also, sleep-walking rapists and sleep-driving murderers. So much for thought experiments. :-)
Don't forget comatose rape victims, Thora. ;p And that fellow from Austin Powers who wanted baby back ribs?
@kendo - In case you missed the link (hint: Oh, 'AAAARG', you missed it, curses.) - http://sn.im/vzzntxzmtjz - Oh look, this 'randomly' generated shortened URL looks a little similar to other URLs such as generated by sites linked here.
@IceCream - Oh, and that paper does seem structured a bit oddly, perhaps start with the Conclusion?
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 6:29 pm)
nest0r wrote:
Don't forget comatose rape victims, Thora. ;p
You can't rape a comatose person, silly. They're not conscious, so there's no suffering. No direct harm, no crime. One cannot claim an interest or right to not be harmed if there's no awareness of being harmed.
Besides, the neurothingies triggered an electrical impulse across the synaptic thingie which caused involuntary muscle twitching which was reasonably interpreted as a consenting nod.
.... how about them whales, eh? :-)
kendo99 wrote:
Really, we are in the realm of science fiction at this point, but I see absolutely no scientific or philosophical reason to rule out conscious robots, even without organic/biological components.
Well, you wouldn't if you assumed functionalism. ![]()
I'm not convinced of functionalism at all and it has never sounded even remotely plausible to me.
I know I said I'd leave the discussion of consciousness, but I'll take a moment to explain a few things...
Thora wrote:
vileru wrote:
However, I kindly suggest moving the conversation away from neuro-anatomy since its very easy to spiral out into wild speculation.
..unlike purely philosophical attempts to explain consciousness?
The difference is that the speculation that goes on in neurological explanations of consciousness presents itself as scientifically based, suggesting its credibility, although it's just the same kind of speculation used in philosophy with scientific findings sprinkled on top. Claiming that an entity is conscious because its brain structures are similar to a humans is just as speculative as claiming that a human is conscious because it can describe its feelings in ways you and I can understand.
It's funny how expanding on a theory I explored in jest has led to a heated debate, and even a revisit to Descartes! I will concede that most of the criticisms of my posts are justified. However, as I expressed in my previous posts, I purposefully did not consider the arguments in depth. Ironically, my goal was to push the discussion in new directions rather than spark criticisms. With a similar goal in mind, I suggested to avoid the neurological discussion not because I think it's irrelevant, but since I foresaw an impending debate to nowhere about what neuroscience suggests about consciousness.
At any rate, my true philosophical stance is much different from both the one I developed in my posts and the neural-cognitive one that is popular today. However, I'm not one to lay out all my cards on the table. Anyway, I deeply respect those of you who have held me responsible for my words. However, please treat me more kindly in the future! I know the position I put forth is controversial, but that doesn't justify dismissive remarks. It's a little unseemly to mock other posters in a thread concerned about ethics. The purpose of discussion is to explore ideas, not to battle egos. A mentor who I respect very much once told me, "I grade papers, not people." This is the sort of attitude that makes constructive, pleasant discussion.
/my last post in this thread
Last edited by vileru (2010 April 19, 6:39 pm)
Interesting article about the fish pain, I'll have to poke around for the actual journal article. Of course, the scientist there is "assuming," like me, that you can use neuro-anatomical similarities and behavior to demonstrate a parallel. So, to those who won't see those two things as evidence, it's kind of a moot point. But, it makes me feel better about my hypothesis. *grin*
Haven't gotten to dig around in Mellassoux much yet, but it is on my to-do list... I really do think its sexy theory.
Eh, did you only read the one link via the sn.im thing? (i.e. Did you get 'both' links.)
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 6:41 pm)
Got them now, thanks ![]()
kendo99 wrote:
Got them now, thanks
Sorry, I didn't delete--I mean, uh, criticize, the cover of the book before not-linking to it. I hate that thing. The physical copy, sans jacket, is simple black with the title and author in nice gold lettering on the side.
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 7:12 pm)
[@ Vileru ] You may have noticed I picked up on your jest in that other thread (phew - good thing I didn't get that wrong) :-)
In case the rest of your comments were also directed at me, please know I wasn't intending to be unkind. I don't think you need to take anything here personally. You've admitted to occasionally delivering your opinions fairly bluntly. So, if anything, people might assume you would welcome being directly challenged. My attempts at humour/smilie sarcasm often fail, though, so I apologize if something came across as rude. :-)
Last edited by Thora (2010 April 20, 3:29 am)
@vileru - I feel guilty now for helping to distract from Japanese and spoiling my own vacation from such posts, but I do hope you'll read some of my links or use them as nodal tangents for your own research. If you're already well familiar with the current cognitive neuroscience of consciousness and still think it's mostly speculative and comparable to facile evidence use in certain philosophical theories, and still think there's a 'problem of other minds' and/or a 'hard problem', then I can't say much to change your mind, methinks.
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 7:48 pm)
Thora wrote:
nest0r wrote:
Don't forget comatose rape victims, Thora. ;p
You can't rape a comatose person, silly. They're not conscious, so there's no suffering. No direct harm, no crime. One cannot claim an interest or right to not be harmed if there's no awareness of being harmed.
Besides, the neurothingies triggered an electrical impulse across the synaptic thingie which caused involuntary muscle twitching which was reasonably interpreted as a consenting nod.
.... how about them whales, eh? :-)
I hold comatose people accountable for their actions and would refuse to change their bedsheets or feed them. We don't know enough about consciousness to say they can't wake up and do it themselves at some point.
Also, I think your explanation of synapses and electrical impulses is inaccurate, without further qualification.
That reminds me, I wonder what possible role 'smart fluids' could play in AI? I know little on the topics beyond the artificial muscle stuff.
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 19, 8:57 pm)
IceCream wrote:
i think you're placing too much importance on the electrical impulse and not enough on the chemical. i had in mind that base levels of such chemicals can have effects on a conscious level regardless of the impulses, but it looks like it would affect the impulse regardless, so, it's difficult to tell just from that. (knowledge of biology is not my strong point btw.
It all comes down to energy. Memory/consciousness is the result of energy produced by chemical reactions on a cellular level (my assumption). These reactions signal on/off, yes/no, hot/cold, etc. How would, say, a massive electronic switch board be any different.
Why would there be any sort secret ingredient in the chemicals?
Whether biology is your strong point or not, all you're doing is taking a look at a small difference and using it as a base for what determines consciousness. This is akin to saying, "I think consciousness is determined by the pigmentation of the eyes."
vileru wrote:
kazelee wrote:
How is it difficult to imagine consciousness without awareness?
Before becoming aware of myself I have many vivid memories where it seems I'm almost autonomic in the things I do.Yet, you have a memory of those autonomic experiences, which means that you were aware of it to some degree.
How does the memory alone suggest evidence of awareness? Can it be proven that the two are so intrinsically tied together?
There are many who have memories of committing acts to which they were not aware they were committing at the time. The awareness only comes afterwards, when the situation is revisited in their minds. In these cases there is lose of consciousness and memory, but awareness has been removed from the picture.
Might find these interesting:
In addition to the aforementioned Signatures of Consciousness talk that discussed analog and digital, re: global neuronal workspace (which also cited Von Neumann on computers and brains) - http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/20 … 223937.htm <-- That's interesting, I haven't read much else on the topic... See also The Number Sense for some interesting thoughts including bits about animals and calculation...
On consciousness, perception, awareness, attention, etc. (see also 'process pure' models of explicit/implicit, process dissociation procedure, learning, and the "Introspective Physicalism" paper in The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness pdf, previously linked):
http://neurociencia.df.uba.ar/publico/c … xonomy.pdf
http://www.unicog.org/publications/Koui … oc2007.pdf
http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/301/1/546.pdf
This chapter surprised me, wasn't expecting to find discussion of blindsight, animal consciousness, animal models, NCC, and sleepwalking all at once.
Also: http://www.livescience.com/animals/0909 … imals.html - Interesting bit distinguishing metacognition and self-awareness... It's interesting how many metamemory/metacognition studies have come out this past decade as well, especially the past couple of years.
Andreas Demetriou on hypercognition is also intriguing... see the neutral words I am using? ;p Fascinating. 面白い。
Last edited by nest0r (2010 April 20, 1:04 am)

