Micheal Jackson:(

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Mcjon01 Member
From: 大阪 Registered: 2007-04-09 Posts: 551

I'm actually quite content knowing that I'm nothing more (and nothing less!) than a walking bag of meat filled with chemicals.  Though I would, someday, like to move up to a higher grade of meat and perhaps some more complicated chemicals.

Some kind of wireless connection would also be good.

vinniram Member
From: Brisbane, Australia Registered: 2009-05-09 Posts: 370

yeah, I'm only seventeen. my mum's pretty heavily into mindfulness stuff and tries to teach me... I try to apply it, but there are things to which I find it hard to apply. You know, Michael was a very spiritual person - was a Jehovah's witness, then agnostic for a while (I am fairly sure), and then converted to Islam after his brother Jermaine suggested it.

Tzadeck Member
From: Kinki Registered: 2009-02-21 Posts: 2484

Burritolingus wrote:

Tzadeck wrote:

I've never really considered the concept of the 'ego' to be useful at all, so if anyone knows any good sources that could change my mind let me know.

Honestly, it took quite a while for my Western brain to really get a good grip on what "ego" or "self" was, personally. Mebbe Bodhisamaya could elaborate? (I sure can't!)

I've read some of the authors you're talking about, especially Shunryu Suzuki, but I barely remember any of what was said at all!

Actually, there are a lot of Japanese ways of thinking that I understand really well.  I've read quite a bit about culture in Asia (I was an Asian studies major), but I don't really grasp or remember a lot of things from countries other than Japan.  What trend of (Eastern) thought has the idea of 'ego' and 'self' that you're talking about?  I always viewed the term 'ego' as primarily Freudian, and if I remember correctly it wasn't really used in English before people starting using it to translate Freud.

bodhisamaya wrote:

It is easy to recognize superficially that the flesh suit most people call self is not the self.  Live in it for 70 years or so and then move on (what ever it is that moves on).

I don't think this way, simply because I factually disagree with you.  The way I usually look at things is that people first decide what they consider to be truth, and then they try to learn how to live their life by following that truth.  More accurately, people continue to revise what they consider to be true as they try to follow what is true, but in general how you act follows from what you believe is true.

So, a Christian might first decide that she believes that Jesus is God.  Then she might also conclude that the Bible is in fact the word of God, or at least divinely inspired.  So, from this she would start learning about the Bible, and how she can apply it to her life.  Of course, Christians do this in all sorts of ways, and how she does it is just one of them.

But, someone who's a Hindu, or an atheist, will follow a completely different path in how to live their life.  What they believe to be true is just different.

And, so is my case.  I'm basically in agreement with Mcjon01.  A complicated enough system can do truly amazing things, just as a relatively complicated serial system like a computer is able to let one talk on this forum, play Half-Life2, study Japanese, and watch other people have overly-staged sex.

And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on.  When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer).  And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me.  I am a walking bag of flesh.

Last edited by Tzadeck (2009 December 19, 7:18 pm)

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sokino Member
Registered: 2009-10-26 Posts: 26

Tzadeck wrote:

And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on.  When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer).  And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me.  I am a walking bag of flesh.

How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.

Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Wow, this thread got hijacked....

Last edited by sokino (2009 December 21, 1:32 am)

nest0r Member
Registered: 2007-10-19 Posts: 5236 Website

sokino wrote:

Tzadeck wrote:

And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on.  When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer).  And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me.  I am a walking bag of flesh.

How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.

Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Wow, this thread got hijacked....

I'm with Daniel Dennett's more functionalist perspective (multiple drafts, now 'fame in the brain') -- there is no Hard Problem. Dehaene's coming around too via global neuronal workspace theory, from what I read at Edge recently.

Related:
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/cognition.fin.htm
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dehaene … index.html
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2008/07/d … c_and.html

Mcjon01 Member
From: 大阪 Registered: 2007-04-09 Posts: 551

sokino wrote:

Tzadeck wrote:

And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on.  When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer).  And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me.  I am a walking bag of flesh.

How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.

Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Wow, this thread got hijacked....

I've dabbled, though I haven't really had a chance to buckle down and start consuming knowledge.  Japanese still takes up that frontburner with me. big_smile I'm a certified qualophobe, though, to put it in the wiki's vernacular.  I like Marvin Minsky's thoughts on the matter, but I tend to like his thoughts on most matters, so maybe there's some bias?  I mean, my interest in cognitive science only exists in the first place because of my interest in computer intelligence.

sokino Member
Registered: 2009-10-26 Posts: 26

nest0r wrote:

sokino wrote:

Tzadeck wrote:

And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on.  When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer).  And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me.  I am a walking bag of flesh.

How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.

Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Wow, this thread got hijacked....

I'm with Daniel Dennett's more functionalist perspective (multiple drafts, now 'fame in the brain') -- there is no Hard Problem. Dehaene's coming around too via global neuronal workspace theory, from what I read at Edge recently.

Related:
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/cognition.fin.htm
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dehaene … index.html
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2008/07/d … c_and.html

Personally, I believe there are good objections against functionalism like the varieties of knowledge and inverted/absent qualia arguments. I'd be willing to discuss them if you want (lol way off topic now).

@ Mcjon01

I think that Minsky believes that one day computers can/will be conscious. I heartily disagree - they may be able to exactly mimic what a human would do but I do not think there will ever be a time when they gain self-awareness or are have 1st person subjective point of view. I don't think people will ever be wondering  over "what it's like" to be a super-intelligent computer or android or something.

bodhisamaya Guest

What is it that would prevent a computer from gaining consciousness?  What is it that is unique to flesh that would make it the only home self-awareness could reside?  Both from a theistic and atheistic view. Plants have life. Not sure if they have awareness.
Some scientists say that carbon based life-forms might not even be the most common form of life in the universe.

Tzadeck Member
From: Kinki Registered: 2009-02-21 Posts: 2484

sokino wrote:

How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.

Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Wow, this thread got hijacked....

Actually I've studied quite a bit about it.  I mentioned above that I was an Asian studies major, but as a matter of fact I double majored in philosophy.  However, I lost interest in the mind-body problem and things related to it a long time ago since some sort of physicalism seemed the obvious outcome to me.  Only a culture that believed in a soul for historical contingent reasons (i.e., religious reasons) would still seriously be considering dualism.

I've never really found non-conscious, non-subjective matter producing consciousness to be a very pressing problem... as I said above, it's a system and the system produces consciousness. 

If you ever find a time machine, bring an IPhone and some way to charge it (a generator) back 800 years or so.  See if people can figure out how the system manages to produce what it does.  It's not gonna happen, because reverse engineering an IPhone is way too big a task for that time (even 100 years ago it'd be a huge undertaking).  People used to be able to learn about radio's by tinkering with broken ones.  There's a reason people don't do that anymore, and an even bigger reason why people don't do it with things like IPhones.  The systems are too small and complicated to gather any meaning from them.  In the same way, it's proving very hard to found out really specific things about consciousness, but we're finding some things out. 

Nest0r mentioned Dennett, who gives a pretty good argument in favor of his multiple drafts model in Consciousness Explained, but unfortunately the book is a little bit of an annoying winding road.  I mention it only because someone without a science degree can read it, but it's still a serious academic work on consciousness.  I wouldn't put too much money into any of his specifics, but he's certainly going in the right direction.

As a side note, if humans continue to live in a relatively stable world for the next 300 years, I'd be very very surprised if there weren't conscious computers.  But that's another story.

Last edited by Tzadeck (2009 December 21, 7:29 am)

Mcjon01 Member
From: 大阪 Registered: 2007-04-09 Posts: 551

Well, since Tzadeck went and said a lot of what I was planning on (and a lot beyond, too) before I got dragged out for yakiniku, I'm just going to leave a quote from Dennet on the topic of philosophical zombies, which seems to be the roundabout argument being used against consciousness in computers.

Daniel Dennet wrote:

Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact — a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination — is like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness.

/This isn't quote mining!
//I mean, it's totally in context.
///I'm just too lazy to write what other people have already said better, is all.

nest0r Member
Registered: 2007-10-19 Posts: 5236 Website

Indeed, the p-zombie issue is another one of those fascinating imaginative acts, yet still essentially just another trick question. I suppose Dennett would call it an 'intuition pump' (also see 'zombic hunch' and 'zimbo' -- he's adorable, that Dennett).

Tzadeck, I only recently realized that Consciousness Explained is rather dated now, Dennett's moved on as well (focusing on free will and cultural evolution I suppose, haven't read his other books), but I think really he's letting those cog sci youngsters like Dehaene carry the torch now. That first essay I linked was a kind of intro to the researchers presented in a compilation of papers in 2001 or so, and at the time Dehaene seemed on the fence about qualia, but in that Edge transcription of his Paris talk (section heading: "A global neuronal workspace") he seemed to agree there was no Hard Problem as well, so I'm pleased.

I'm not involved in, ah, this field/industry/et cetera, but I'm still glad to see the developments towards what confirm my own notions. Dehaene's managed to synthesize Baars' notion of 'global workspace', make it more robust, without getting carried away* with neural correlates of consciousness, a poorly used theater metaphor, and other problems with Baars' model. *Confusing cause/correlation

IceCream and I had a conversation about consciousness in the Lucid Dreams thread, but we mutually deleted all the OT stuff. Well, mostly I just felt self-conscious and wanted to delete because I have a tendency to blend my personal views with theories. So this'll be my last comment on the topic. ;p

http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/csaba/downloads/dehaene.pdf
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Mul … afts_model (Most up-to-date [updated by Dennett] info on Dennett's thoughts, methinks)

Last edited by nest0r (2009 December 21, 2:29 pm)

sokino Member
Registered: 2009-10-26 Posts: 26

You guys are making it hard for me to be doing what I'm supposed to be doing - learning japanese! tongue I had no idea there were other philosophy enthusiasts here (then again I rarely check this part of the forum).

Tzadeck wrote:

Actually I've studied quite a bit about it.  I mentioned above that I was an Asian studies major, but as a matter of fact I double majored in philosophy.  However, I lost interest in the mind-body problem and things related to it a long time ago since some sort of physicalism seemed the obvious outcome to me.  Only a culture that believed in a soul for historical contingent reasons (i.e., religious reasons) would still seriously be considering dualism.

Yet that would do nothing to argue against whether or not dualism is true. It's like saying that only a culture that generally doesn't believe in a soul for historical contingent reasons would still be seriously considering monism. That may be trivially true but it says nothing interesting nor does it provide an argument.

Tzadeck wrote:

I've never really found non-conscious, non-subjective matter producing consciousness to be a very pressing problem... as I said above, it's a system and the system produces consciousness.

That as it stands is just a bare assertion. Note, a lot of modern scientists with physicalist inclinations (even more physicalist/materialist philosophers) aren't claiming that that when a system reaches a sufficient amount of complexity it will magically gain consciousness. They claim while they believe while consciousness has a material explanation they are at a complete loss to explain how this happens.

I find the problem hugely, well, problematic. Because it seems consciousness and the brain are in entirely different ontological categories. As, like I said before, consciousness/mental have features that the physical, material does not have.

Tzadeck wrote:

Nest0r mentioned Dennett, who gives a pretty good argument in favor of his multiple drafts model in Consciousness Explained, but unfortunately the book is a little bit of an annoying winding road.  I mention it only because someone without a science degree can read it, but it's still a serious academic work on consciousness.  I wouldn't put too much money into any of his specifics, but he's certainly going in the right direction.

I've read his book (I actually found it at a local borders). tongue I just didn't find it convincing. If I had to pick a naturalist (which I'm not one btw) I most agree with it would have to be David Chalmers, John Searle, Thomas Nagel, or Frank Jackson.

One example of why I do not find Dennett convincing in the slightest - he asks proponents of the hard problem on consciousness for "independent evidence" for the "postulation" of conscious experience. That entirely and utterly misses the point. Consciousness isn't "postulated" to explain other things; rather it's something that has to be explained in it's own right. We wouldn't be able to contemplate the "independent evidence" for consciousness if we weren't conscious in the first place! Consciousness is a presupposition to philosophy not some pointless "postulate" that needs to be backed up by "independent evidence".

Tzadeck Member
From: Kinki Registered: 2009-02-21 Posts: 2484

sokino wrote:

Yet that would do nothing to argue against whether or not dualism is true. It's like saying that only a culture that generally doesn't believe in a soul for historical contingent reasons would still be seriously considering monism. That may be trivially true but it says nothing interesting nor does it provide an argument.

You're right, it does have nothing to do with whether or not dualism is true.  What I mean is, I believe the arguments in favor of dualism (which I did not mention) seem to me to be bad, but people continue to believe in dualism anyway.  I think the reason is because dualism is deeply a part of western culture.  I know that I'm not arguing anything, nor is it convincing, and it certainly isn't interesting--I'm just saying what I've come to believe.  Actually, I must be completely rusty on the arguments.  For a couple of years I went through them pretty regularly, then I came to my decision, and I've slowly forgotten a lot.  If you don't find a line of thought interesting, and you come to a conclusion, it doesn't seem worth the effort to keep bringing it up again and again in your mind.  I, at least, can only focus on so many things at once; sometimes its time to worry about things that interest you more.  At any rate, I COULD be wrong about dualism.

Now, if we wanted to be serious philosophers here we would talk about specific arguments about dualism.  Actually, I've been packing for America the last couple of days, and I don't really have time to be serious about this (though, you're welcome to post any arguments if you want to and refresh my memory a bit.  As of Wednesday I'll be in America and on vacation, so I might have time).  I've grown pretty skeptical about the methodology of philosophy, or at least about it's ability to reach conclusions, and I'd be surprised if a debate about dualism would be fruitful at all.  Nevertheless, it could be a bit of fun, which is the only reason I ever did philosophy.

sokino wrote:

That as it stands is just a bare assertion. Note, a lot of modern scientists with physicalist inclinations (even more physicalist/materialist philosophers) aren't claiming that that when a system reaches a sufficient amount of complexity it will magically gain consciousness. They claim while they believe while consciousness has a material explanation they are at a complete loss to explain how this happens.

You're right that it's an assertion.  Also, if we're being serious philosophers you shouldn't use 'magically,' as that word is only used to make an idea sound absurd regardless of whether or not there's a reason to belive that it is.  The Christian argues "A bunch of matter MAGICALLY started moving around and thinking," and the atheist argues, "God MAGICALLY has existed forever and is all powerful, and MAGICALLY created life all at once!"

Incidentally, I'm with those scientists--obviously I'm also at a complete loss to even remotely explain.  But, with majors like Asian studies and philosophy, I really didn't go into the right field to make an attempt.  At the same time, there're certain connections between how one thinks and the matter of one's nervous system that even I can see.  If you get a head injury that causes damage to your brain, it's going to change your ability to think, and therefore the way that you are conscious (anybody remember the name of the guy who had a pipe go through his head in a dynamite explosion?  His skull is at Harvard still I believe.  A particularly good example, but I can't find his name right now).

sokino wrote:

I find the problem hugely, well, problematic. Because it seems consciousness and the brain are in entirely different ontological categories. As, like I said before, consciousness/mental have features that the physical, material does not have.

Well, saying that they're in different ontological categories is the same thing as saying that dualism is correct.  That is, dualism means that there's more than one type of ontological category.  So, saying that is making a pretty big claim with a one sentence explanation.  At any rate, an IPhone has a bunch of features that plastic, metal, and glass don't have.  It seems that way, doesn't it?

sokino wrote:

I've read his book (I actually found it at a local borders). tongue I just didn't find it convincing. If I had to pick a naturalist (which I'm not one btw) I most agree with it would have to be David Chalmers, John Searle, Thomas Nagel, or Frank Jackson.

One example of why I do not find Dennett convincing in the slightest - he asks proponents of the hard problem on consciousness for "independent evidence" for the "postulation" of conscious experience. That entirely and utterly misses the point. Consciousness isn't "postulated" to explain other things; rather it's something that has to be explained in it's own right. We wouldn't be able to contemplate the "independent evidence" for consciousness if we weren't conscious in the first place! Consciousness is a presupposition to philosophy not some pointless "postulate" that needs to be backed up by "independent evidence".

Haha, I hate Searle so much (Damn Chinese room)!  Nagel isn't so bad, he creates good examples, but I usually draw different conclusions from them than he does.  I don't know Jackson or Chalmers very well.

As for your last point, I've never really thought about, so I'll do that. 

This is the longest post I've ever written.  Thread successfully hijacked!

Last edited by Tzadeck (2009 December 21, 7:35 pm)