Thank you guys.
Tzadeck Wrote:So, for most of modern western philosophy there was a big distinction between the mind and the physical world. And there was a big distinction made between what is learned from the senses and what is learned through thinking. Because of the importance of those distinctions, the mind and senses were seen in very different ways. So the idea in western philosophy was usually that they are completely different things--the opposite of how the mind is seen in Buddhism.
My experience seems to agree that everything is deducted from the senses. And my mind does not truly know or understand anything. It seems the mind runs on an association "fuzzy matching" sort of algorithm which is sometimes very apparent (not to mention that's what we use in RTK

).
Still, there is still this strange distinction between what is real and what is not real.
I found a quote from a critique of Berkeley:
"Berkeley notes that the ideas that constitute real things exhibit a steadiness, vivacity, and distinctness that chimerical ideas do not."
I think it safe to say that's how most of us feel about this?
That's my intuitive understanding.
Anyway I see now the crux of my doubt is to find out what's real.
Intuitively, what's real to me is what is immediately perceived; And its O.K. to perceive optical illusions. I don't mind about that. The mind can come and say "this is an illusion". Whew. I didn't fall run after a mirage or whatever. The mind can not know everything and so perfect decisions are not possible.
So I'm fine with physical senses as my reality.
Where I have doubts is, for example, a lot of self-help material is built on the idea that thoughts can express ideas that are false.
So then, you can make a distinction between the experience of thought which you could say is "real" (in the
idealist sense). That experience you could say is a form of auditory memory. For example you hear words when you read. So then I can see a distinction between verbal thought and its meaning, which seems to be arrived through association.
But even so, there is still this idea that the physical senses are what's real.
vileru Wrote:As you can see, Kant's view of the mind is more interconnected with the senses than Descartes'.
Yes, thank you. I read that he still believed in "physical" objects that can't be known directly and thus will forever be unknown.
However I do like Berkeley's idealist description a lot better. Even if challenging
I will admit, I am interested in this purely through an interest in nondualism.
I started reading Berkeley after reading Greg Goode's article here:
http://nondualityamerica.wordpress.com/2...hilosophy/
Of course Berkeley talks about a God in order to support a non-solipsist view. I'm not too concerned with that. I see what parts work and which parts don't work. I've never thought of "god" as an individual entity either, so that's less of an issue than seems to be for many atheists who seem to be stuck with the idea of "god" as an individual/personal entity.
So speaking from that point of view I think the main issue philosophers have is that of accepting that there is an intelligence at work which we are not aware of.
For example, there seems to be scientific support recently for the absence of free will:
This could also support an understanding that happens before conscious thought.
Libet’s 1985 study on the illusion of free will is replicated with modern brain imaging
http://www.mindfields.org.uk/blog/?p=191
I am very puzzled myself and have been wondering for a long time just what part of understanding does verbal thinking play? Because we can see pretty clearly that babies understand things long before they learn to speak. It's almost as if... verbal thinking is just that, purely verbal. Purely for the purpose of communicating.
But anyway.. this was bound to snowball and get out of my initial topic, sorry
It's too hard to discuss "particulars" for me. :p
vileru Wrote:At any rate, theories like Descartes' and Kant's are known as representational theories of the mind, i.e. the mind tries to represent the external world. You (Fabrice) seem like you'd be more interested in nonrepresentational theories, and so I suggest you read Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. While far from perfect, I think it's an accessible introduction to nonrepresentation. In the manuscript, Rorty frequently refers to both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, who are both nonrepresentationalists, and therefore the book also serves as a nice introduction to Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Anyhow, I need to jump in the bath, but I hope I was of help.
Thanks! I see Greg Goode also recommends Rorty's "Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Vol. 1".
Here's an excerpt in case you're interested:
Greg Goode Wrote:Appearance/Reality – Things seem so intransigently distant because we think that our thoughts are supposed to represent an independent reality that is not made of thoughts. One of the best philosophical antidotes to this dualism is W.T. Stace’s clear and engaging “Refutation of Realism” (Stace, 1934). Stace (1886-1967) was a mystic and a philosopher who combined Eastern with Western approaches. In his 1934 article he updates Berkeley by arguing that there is no such thing as an unexperienced object.
Then there are Richard Rorty's well-written essays in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Vol. 1 (Rorty, 1991), especially the Introduction and “Inquiry as recontextualisation: An anti-dualist account of interpretation.” Rorty calls himself an “antirepresentationalist.” He argues against both realism (the external existence of the world) and antirealism (there exists only a web of beliefs). Both sides of the debate are based on the unsupportable claim that our ideas represent things that are not ideas. This representational claim can never be proven, so there is no basis upon which to make the distinction between realism and antirealism. Hence the distinction is unnecessary.
Sigh. Too much reading (~_~)
I think I'll go for Rorty after Berkeley.