Burritolingus Wrote:I've read some of the authors you're talking about, especially Shunryu Suzuki, but I barely remember any of what was said at all!Tzadeck Wrote:I've never really considered the concept of the 'ego' to be useful at all, so if anyone knows any good sources that could change my mind let me know.Honestly, it took quite a while for my Western brain to really get a good grip on what "ego" or "self" was, personally. Mebbe Bodhisamaya could elaborate? (I sure can't!)
bodhisamaya Wrote:It is easy to recognize superficially that the flesh suit most people call self is not the self. Live in it for 70 years or so and then move on (what ever it is that moves on).I don't think this way, simply because I factually disagree with you. The way I usually look at things is that people first decide what they consider to be truth, and then they try to learn how to live their life by following that truth. More accurately, people continue to revise what they consider to be true as they try to follow what is true, but in general how you act follows from what you believe is true.
Tzadeck Wrote:And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on. When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer). And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me. I am a walking bag of flesh.How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.
sokino Wrote:I'm with Daniel Dennett's more functionalist perspective (multiple drafts, now 'fame in the brain') -- there is no Hard Problem. Dehaene's coming around too via global neuronal workspace theory, from what I read at Edge recently.Tzadeck Wrote:And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on. When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer). And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me. I am a walking bag of flesh.How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.
Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Wow, this thread got hijacked....
sokino Wrote:I've dabbled, though I haven't really had a chance to buckle down and start consuming knowledge. Japanese still takes up that frontburner with me.Tzadeck Wrote:And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on. When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer). And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me. I am a walking bag of flesh.How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.
Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Wow, this thread got hijacked....
I'm a certified qualophobe, though, to put it in the wiki's vernacular. I like Marvin Minsky's thoughts on the matter, but I tend to like his thoughts on most matters, so maybe there's some bias? I mean, my interest in cognitive science only exists in the first place because of my interest in computer intelligence.
nest0r Wrote:Personally, I believe there are good objections against functionalism like the varieties of knowledge and inverted/absent qualia arguments. I'd be willing to discuss them if you want (lol way off topic now).sokino Wrote:I'm with Daniel Dennett's more functionalist perspective (multiple drafts, now 'fame in the brain') -- there is no Hard Problem. Dehaene's coming around too via global neuronal workspace theory, from what I read at Edge recently.Tzadeck Wrote:And so I believe that a parallel system of chemicals like the human brain is able to generate consciousness, 'self', 'ego', willful movement, and so on. When the structure of the system is compromised it no longer works, just as a computer stops working when it's structure is messed up (try hitting one with a hammer). And so I believe that when my structure is messed up, it no longer works, and that's the end of me. I am a walking bag of flesh.How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.
Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Wow, this thread got hijacked....
Related:
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/cognition.fin.htm
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dehaene0...index.html
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2008/07/de...c_and.html
sokino Wrote:How much philosophy of the mind have you studied? Because there are VERY good reasons to suppose that that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter or physical interactions.Actually I've studied quite a bit about it. I mentioned above that I was an Asian studies major, but as a matter of fact I double majored in philosophy. However, I lost interest in the mind-body problem and things related to it a long time ago since some sort of physicalism seemed the obvious outcome to me. Only a culture that believed in a soul for historical contingent reasons (i.e., religious reasons) would still seriously be considering dualism.
Like, for example, the hard problem of consciousness and qualia. It's very hard to see how non-conscious and non-subjective matter suddenly, magically, arranges itself properly to create consciousness and subjectivity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Wow, this thread got hijacked....
Daniel Dennet Wrote:Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact — a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination — is like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness./This isn't quote mining!
I had no idea there were other philosophy enthusiasts here (then again I rarely check this part of the forum).Tzadeck Wrote:Actually I've studied quite a bit about it. I mentioned above that I was an Asian studies major, but as a matter of fact I double majored in philosophy. However, I lost interest in the mind-body problem and things related to it a long time ago since some sort of physicalism seemed the obvious outcome to me. Only a culture that believed in a soul for historical contingent reasons (i.e., religious reasons) would still seriously be considering dualism.Yet that would do nothing to argue against whether or not dualism is true. It's like saying that only a culture that generally doesn't believe in a soul for historical contingent reasons would still be seriously considering monism. That may be trivially true but it says nothing interesting nor does it provide an argument.
Tzadeck Wrote:I've never really found non-conscious, non-subjective matter producing consciousness to be a very pressing problem... as I said above, it's a system and the system produces consciousness.That as it stands is just a bare assertion. Note, a lot of modern scientists with physicalist inclinations (even more physicalist/materialist philosophers) aren't claiming that that when a system reaches a sufficient amount of complexity it will magically gain consciousness. They claim while they believe while consciousness has a material explanation they are at a complete loss to explain how this happens.
Tzadeck Wrote:Nest0r mentioned Dennett, who gives a pretty good argument in favor of his multiple drafts model in Consciousness Explained, but unfortunately the book is a little bit of an annoying winding road. I mention it only because someone without a science degree can read it, but it's still a serious academic work on consciousness. I wouldn't put too much money into any of his specifics, but he's certainly going in the right direction.I've read his book (I actually found it at a local borders).
I just didn't find it convincing. If I had to pick a naturalist (which I'm not one btw) I most agree with it would have to be David Chalmers, John Searle, Thomas Nagel, or Frank Jackson.sokino Wrote:Yet that would do nothing to argue against whether or not dualism is true. It's like saying that only a culture that generally doesn't believe in a soul for historical contingent reasons would still be seriously considering monism. That may be trivially true but it says nothing interesting nor does it provide an argument.You're right, it does have nothing to do with whether or not dualism is true. What I mean is, I believe the arguments in favor of dualism (which I did not mention) seem to me to be bad, but people continue to believe in dualism anyway. I think the reason is because dualism is deeply a part of western culture. I know that I'm not arguing anything, nor is it convincing, and it certainly isn't interesting--I'm just saying what I've come to believe. Actually, I must be completely rusty on the arguments. For a couple of years I went through them pretty regularly, then I came to my decision, and I've slowly forgotten a lot. If you don't find a line of thought interesting, and you come to a conclusion, it doesn't seem worth the effort to keep bringing it up again and again in your mind. I, at least, can only focus on so many things at once; sometimes its time to worry about things that interest you more. At any rate, I COULD be wrong about dualism.
sokino Wrote:That as it stands is just a bare assertion. Note, a lot of modern scientists with physicalist inclinations (even more physicalist/materialist philosophers) aren't claiming that that when a system reaches a sufficient amount of complexity it will magically gain consciousness. They claim while they believe while consciousness has a material explanation they are at a complete loss to explain how this happens.You're right that it's an assertion. Also, if we're being serious philosophers you shouldn't use 'magically,' as that word is only used to make an idea sound absurd regardless of whether or not there's a reason to belive that it is. The Christian argues "A bunch of matter MAGICALLY started moving around and thinking," and the atheist argues, "God MAGICALLY has existed forever and is all powerful, and MAGICALLY created life all at once!"
sokino Wrote:I find the problem hugely, well, problematic. Because it seems consciousness and the brain are in entirely different ontological categories. As, like I said before, consciousness/mental have features that the physical, material does not have.Well, saying that they're in different ontological categories is the same thing as saying that dualism is correct. That is, dualism means that there's more than one type of ontological category. So, saying that is making a pretty big claim with a one sentence explanation. At any rate, an IPhone has a bunch of features that plastic, metal, and glass don't have. It seems that way, doesn't it?
sokino Wrote:I've read his book (I actually found it at a local borders).Haha, I hate Searle so much (Damn Chinese room)! Nagel isn't so bad, he creates good examples, but I usually draw different conclusions from them than he does. I don't know Jackson or Chalmers very well.
One example of why I do not find Dennett convincing in the slightest - he asks proponents of the hard problem on consciousness for "independent evidence" for the "postulation" of conscious experience. That entirely and utterly misses the point. Consciousness isn't "postulated" to explain other things; rather it's something that has to be explained in it's own right. We wouldn't be able to contemplate the "independent evidence" for consciousness if we weren't conscious in the first place! Consciousness is a presupposition to philosophy not some pointless "postulate" that needs to be backed up by "independent evidence".
