CureDolly wrote: "@Danchan I'd be fascinated to know why Heisig-sensei is wrong philosophically."
That was me being a bit facetious of course. I wouldn't want to say publicly that Heisig is "wrong", so I also probably shouldn't say so online, even if I am ever-so-slightly anonymous. But yes, I disagree with some of the arguments that he and some of his colleagues (Thomas Kasulis and John Maraldo) make about philosophy.
It's to do with how they understand what philosophy is, which relates to their argument that philosophy is a phenomena intrinsic to human societies that can be found probably throughout history in most cultures, and maybe all of them. They aren't unusual in saying this. It's actually a very common position to find in comparative philosophy, and its major journals like Philosophy East and West (Hawai'i university press, since 1951). It's also a position that is strongly based on arguments developed by classical pragmatists, like John Dewey or William James. We can't hope to define things like "civilization" or "religion" or "philosophy" in some apriori manner, as these words are understood as pointing to complex social phenomena that take on a variety of forms, have multiple aspects, over time, across space. (This is kind of the Darwinian side of pragmatism. Human consciousness and society is a kind of "adaptation" to the environment, albeit not a passive one-way kind, but one that involves a kind of feedback loop). So, if we want to know what, say, philosophy is, we should look at lots and lots of different particular kinds of philosophy as found in different environments, and not simply assume, that, for example, a dominant way of doing philosophy (for example, say a logo-centric one or a European one) is the only legitimate way.
I disagree though. I don't think they see it this way, or have even considered it, but I think they have turned "philosophy" into "thought" through this kind of empiricist-botanist approach. That's actually fine, if you are aware of it, and argue with that presupposition. So for example, you might say, "by philosophy, I mean, a kind of deep thinking, generally understood", and then conclude that... "philosophy" is intrinsic to human civilization. What they are doing though is using philosophy in the sense of "thought in general" and yet also in the sense of philosophy as a tradition of questioning, at the same time. So somehow "philosophy as a tradition of questioning" now has existed everywhere, in all places. I'm really not sure how helpful this is to our understanding of philosophy or civilizations. I think it can actually be quite misleading. That's not to say that I don't sympathize with the motivations of Heisig and his colleagues. I agree with some of their premises, and we shouldn't doubt that the arguments of the classical pragmatists have a lot to offer us today. But the matter is not as simple as I think they make it out to be.
That was me being a bit facetious of course. I wouldn't want to say publicly that Heisig is "wrong", so I also probably shouldn't say so online, even if I am ever-so-slightly anonymous. But yes, I disagree with some of the arguments that he and some of his colleagues (Thomas Kasulis and John Maraldo) make about philosophy.
It's to do with how they understand what philosophy is, which relates to their argument that philosophy is a phenomena intrinsic to human societies that can be found probably throughout history in most cultures, and maybe all of them. They aren't unusual in saying this. It's actually a very common position to find in comparative philosophy, and its major journals like Philosophy East and West (Hawai'i university press, since 1951). It's also a position that is strongly based on arguments developed by classical pragmatists, like John Dewey or William James. We can't hope to define things like "civilization" or "religion" or "philosophy" in some apriori manner, as these words are understood as pointing to complex social phenomena that take on a variety of forms, have multiple aspects, over time, across space. (This is kind of the Darwinian side of pragmatism. Human consciousness and society is a kind of "adaptation" to the environment, albeit not a passive one-way kind, but one that involves a kind of feedback loop). So, if we want to know what, say, philosophy is, we should look at lots and lots of different particular kinds of philosophy as found in different environments, and not simply assume, that, for example, a dominant way of doing philosophy (for example, say a logo-centric one or a European one) is the only legitimate way.
I disagree though. I don't think they see it this way, or have even considered it, but I think they have turned "philosophy" into "thought" through this kind of empiricist-botanist approach. That's actually fine, if you are aware of it, and argue with that presupposition. So for example, you might say, "by philosophy, I mean, a kind of deep thinking, generally understood", and then conclude that... "philosophy" is intrinsic to human civilization. What they are doing though is using philosophy in the sense of "thought in general" and yet also in the sense of philosophy as a tradition of questioning, at the same time. So somehow "philosophy as a tradition of questioning" now has existed everywhere, in all places. I'm really not sure how helpful this is to our understanding of philosophy or civilizations. I think it can actually be quite misleading. That's not to say that I don't sympathize with the motivations of Heisig and his colleagues. I agree with some of their premises, and we shouldn't doubt that the arguments of the classical pragmatists have a lot to offer us today. But the matter is not as simple as I think they make it out to be.